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MIDWAY
Sheer Luck or Better Doctrine?
Thomas Wildenberg
Six decades after the spectacular American victory over the Imperial JapaneseNavy’s First Air Fleet, the reasons behind the U.S. Navy’s success at the battle of
Midway are still not fully understood. Though the details of this famous battle
continue to be argued in the pages of scholarly jour-
nals, the critical role of doctrine has not been properly
analyzed.1 Yet it was better doctrine that ultimately led
to the American victory once the forces were engaged,
a victory that changed the course of war in the Pacific.
Doctrine, as defined by the U.S. Department of De-
fense, comprises the fundamental principles by which
military forces guide their actions.2 For the Navy it is
the foundation upon which tactics, techniques, and
procedures are built—a shared way of thinking that
must be uniformly known and understood to be use-
ful and effective.3 Because doctrine articulates the op-
erational concepts that govern the employment of
armed forces, it is critical for the success of any mili-
tary operation—thus its importance in evaluating the
actions of the forces engaged at the battle of Midway.
An analysis of the doctrinal thinking of the two pro-
tagonists reveals significant differences in their ap-
proaches to carrier warfare, differences that were
fundamental to the victor’s success.
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The battle of Midway also marked the final phase in a revolution in military
affairs (RMA) in which the aircraft carrier supplanted the battleship as the abso-
lute determinant of naval supremacy. It was the culmination of a technical revo-
lution in which carrier airpower displaced gunnery as the primary means of
delivering naval ordnance. Moreover, it is one of the few instances in the history
of RMAs in which the dominant player (in this case the U.S. Navy) was success-
ful in implementing a revolutionary change in the basic character of warfare.4
Technology-driven RMAs, such as the paradigm shift to carrier warfare, are
characterized by the introduction of a number of technological innovations in a
series of stages over time. Richard Hundley terms this process the “Multiple In-
novation Model” of an RMA.5 Evaluating the development of carrier warfare on
the basis of this model (table 1) is useful for analyzing how the doctrine of carrier
warfare evolved along parallel, though slightly different, lines in the Japanese and
American navies. This article will explore how these differences affected the out-
come at Midway and their ramifications vis-à-vis the theory of RMAs.
The quintessential element in the development of carrier warfare took place
in stage three of the model, as shown in table 1, when the aircraft carrier came
into being as a totally new system for taking land-based aircraft to sea. The air-
craft carrier, which was introduced by the Royal Navy in World War I, did not
become an important capital ship until the Washington Treaty on Naval Arms
Limitations was enacted in 1922. The treaty, which severely limited the size and
total tonnage of battleships in service among the major navies of the world,
placed limitations on the total carrier tonnage allowed each navy and restricted
any new carrier (i.e., built from the keel up) to twenty-seven thousand tons stan-
dard displacement. A special provision of the treaty permitted the Japanese and
American navies to exceed this limitation, however, by allowing each to convert
two incomplete battle cruisers that would otherwise have been scrapped under
the treaty. As a result of this provision the Japanese and American navies began
plans to construct two thirty-three-thousand-ton aircraft carriers apiece.6 Once
completed, the ships would dwarf any aircraft carrier then in existence. Each
1 2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Stage* Basic Model Carrier Warfare Model
1 New technology Science of Aeronautics
2 New device Airplane
3 New system Carrier and Its Aircraft
4 New operational concept Carrier Air Strike
5 New force structure & doctrine
USN = Task Force
IJN = Air Fleet
* The innovations associated with the stages in the basic model do not always occur in order.
TABLE 1
MULTIPLE INNOVATION MODEL OF THE RMA IN CARRIER WARFARE
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would be capable of operating far more aircraft than had ever been put in the air
by a single ship. How to conduct flight operations in the most efficient manner
with such a large air group had yet to be determined by either navy.
Neither the Japanese nor American navy had any operational experience with
carriers at the time of the treaty’s signing in February 1922. Though both were
commissioning their first experimental carriers, the first flights (from the Japa-
nese Hosho and the American Langley) would not take place for the better part
of a year. In the interim, both navies had to rely for the most part on whatever
knowledge could be gleaned from the British, who had been conducting flight
operations from the full-deck carriers HMS Argus and HMS Eagle. Argus, which
entered service in 1918, was the first aircraft carrier to have a single flight deck
extending the entire ship’s length. Although Eagle was not placed in commission
until 2 February 1924, an extensive series of flight tests was conducted from its
deck in 1920.
The Americans were fortunate in having acquired a great deal of information
on flight operations and carrier design from their British allies during World
War I and the period shortly thereafter.7 The data provided a firm foundation for
the carrier design studies conducted by the U.S. Navy in the early 1920s. These
studies led to the continuous single-flight-deck arrangement on the Saratoga
and Lexington, converted from the two battle cruisers allocated to the U.S. Navy
by the Washington Treaty. The two navies had ceased to share information by the
time of the treaty. The lack of direct contact may have been a godsend to the U.S.
Navy, for it probably prevented a grievous error in carrier design—the twin-
hangar dual flight deck.
This failed innovation appeared on the next generation of British carriers—
Furious, Glorious, and Courageous—the basic design characteristics of which
were established in 1920.8 Unlike the Japanese and American conversions, the
new British carriers were produced from fast but poorly armed and under-
protected cruisers built late in the war. To accommodate the maximum number
of aircraft in the smaller space available, with constraints regarding the arrange-
ment of boiler uptakes, their designers added a second hangar. Adding a small
second flight deck as well, forward of the upper hangar, would (the designers be-
lieved) permit dual-flight-deck operations. In theory this would increase the
speed of launching, so more aircraft could be placed in the air in the least time—
a necessary improvement, as demonstrated by the poor trial performance of the
single-deck Eagle. Because of the time required to spot aircraft between launch-
ings, Eagle could keep only six aircraft in the air at one time.9
The Japanese too benefited from their wartime relationship with the Royal
Navy. Their first aircraft carrier, Hosho, had been designed largely with British
help, and in 1920 a Japanese representative observed air operations on board
W I L D E N B E R G 1 2 3
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Furious.10 In the absence of documentary evidence, one can only make an edu-
cated guess as to the design process for the Akagi and Kaga.11 It seems likely,
based on the timing and similarities in design to Furious, Glorious, and Coura-
geous, that the multiple-flight-deck arrangement of the Japanese vessels was in-
fluenced by information obtained from the Semple Naval Air Mission, which
arrived in Japan in 1921.12 This unofficial delegation of British aviation experts
was invited to provide technical assistance and training to the Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN) in all aspects of aviation. Although its members were mostly pilots
and aircraft designers, it is logical to assume that at least one or two were familiar
with the twin-deck carrier then under development in Great Britain.
The “smoking gun” for this assumption can be seen in features of the first
large Japanese carriers, Akagi and Kaga, commissioned in 1927 and 1928 respec-
tively. Like their British contemporaries, both Japanese carriers sported multiple
flight decks when completed.13 This arrangement proved so unsatisfactory, how-
ever, that both had to be redesigned and rebuilt in the mid-1930s with single
flight decks.14 This unfortunate detour cost the Japanese dearly in lost time—
time that might have been used to explore better methods of conducting flight
operations with the single-deck design that emerged as the standard for the fleet
carriers operated by the IJN in World War II.
This is precisely what transpired on the American side. Like the Japanese fly-
ers on board the Hosho, naval airmen on board Langley initially copied British
operating procedures. Those procedures required a clear deck for landing; as
soon as an aircraft landed it was struck below.15 Although this practice gave flexi-
bility in takeoffs and landings, the time it took to stop an airplane, move it onto
the elevator, and bring it below lengthened the landing cycle. This in turn lim-
ited the number of aircraft that could be operated to the capacity of the ship’s
hangar; the number was also determined to some extent by the time it took a
group of returning aircraft to form up overhead and land.16
The clear-deck landing procedure was used until Captain Joseph M. Reeves
took command of Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet in mid-October 1925. Reeves,
then the U.S. Navy’s foremost authority on battleship gunnery, had just come
from the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, where he had served two
tours of duty—first as a student, then as head of the Tactics Department. It was
there that Reeves learned the importance of aircraft and the critical need to se-
cure command of the air in any future engagement of the Battle Fleet.17
When Reeves took over the Aircraft Squadrons he was surprised to discover
that Langley had put no more than six planes in the air at one time.18 This
seemed an absurdly small figure to Reeves; he would dramatically change it. The
years spent in the fleet perfecting gunnery had taught Reeves the critical impor-
tance of meticulous practice and thorough training. He had also learned the
1 2 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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value of faultless procedures for ensuring speed and safety during any poten-
tially dangerous shipboard activity.19 These same principles he used to cajole
Langley’s air wing to find ways to speed up takeoffs and landings—the recovery
cycle, in modern jargon—so that as many aircraft as possible could be put into
the air and recovered, in the least time. Under Reeves’s tutelage, Langley’s crew
invented the deck park, the crash barrier, specialized teams of flight-deck per-
sonnel identified by jerseys of various colors, and a host of other innovations that
radically changed the way operations were conducted on cramped flight decks.
At first the object was to get as many planes in the air as possible in order to
defend the fleet against attacking bombers. Slowly but surely, the number of
planes operating from Langley expanded, and the time required to launch and
recover aircraft decreased. By February 1926 sixteen planes could be kept in the
air at one time. One year later the number had increased to twenty-two. This was
a big improvement, but Reeves, who had been promoted to flag rank in 1927,
now wanted Langley to operate
even more planes. When the
ship returned from its yearly
overhaul in early 1928, he or-
dered thirty-six aircraft placed
on its flight deck.20 Six more
planes were stowed below, so that when Langley departed from San Diego on 9
April 1928 to join the fleet headed on a transit to Hawaii, it had forty-two aircraft
on board.21
By then Saratoga and Lexington had arrived on the West Coast. The progress
made on Langley’s flight deck paved the way for a spectacular eighty-three-
plane raid launched in an exercise from Saratoga’s flight deck against the locks
and facilities of the Panama Canal on 26 January 1929. The success of this record-
breaking operation—more planes put in the air at one time by one carrier than
ever before—laid the groundwork for the developments that took place in
stage four of the Carrier Warfare Model, establishing the operational concepts
that would determine the carrier’s role in the fleet’s battle plan. During the
next few years the Lexington and Saratoga faced off in a series of simulated en-
gagements conducted during yearly exercises known as “Fleet Problems.” The
carrier-versus-carrier duels that frequently occurred during these exercises
brought to light the importance of quickly locating the opposing carrier so
that air strikes could be launched against the enemy’s flight deck as soon as pos-
sible to forestall a counterstrike. Time after time, the carrier that struck first
emerged victorious. Thus, by the mid-1930s it was understood that the job of
the American carriers was to seek out and destroy the enemy’s flight decks.
This unwritten doctrine—it was not codified until 1941—was responsible for
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the development of a new aircraft type unique to the U.S. Navy, the scout
bomber.22 It was also instrumental in determining the makeup of air groups
aboard American carriers.
While the U.S. Navy was busy experimenting with the carrier-versus-carrier
duels that would so heavily influence its future battle doctrine, the Japanese were
still struggling to perfect their carrier doctrine. Sidetracked by the war in China,
Japanese naval aviators made little progress in working out an effective strategy
for dealing with enemy flight decks.23 Like their American counterparts, the Jap-
anese expected aerial operations to precede the “decisive” clash of battleships
that both sides predicted would determine the outcome of the next war.24 Unlike
the Americans, however, they failed to anticipate the importance of carrier-
based scouting, concentrating entirely on the attack mission.25 No scouting units
were assigned to the Japanese carriers, and little emphasis was placed on this im-
portant aspect of carrier warfare. Reconnaissance was relegated to a few
floatplanes, which would be catapulted from accompanying cruisers. The Japa-
nese also overlooked or failed to develop the deck park, relying instead on the
hangar deck to store and prepare aircraft for flight. On the Japanese carriers, air-
craft capacity was determined by the size of the hangar, not of the flight deck, as
was the case for the Americans.26 The disparity in aircraft-handling procedures
and search strategies resulted in substantial differences in the makeup of the
typical air group deployed by the two sides.
As can be seen from table 2, the U.S. Navy, because of its innovative use of the
deck park, was able to deploy more planes per carrier. Each carrier operated with
seventy-two aircraft, on average, organized into four squadrons: one fighter
(VF), one scout (VS), one bombing (VB), and one torpedo (VT). The Japanese,
on average, operated with just sixty-three aircraft, organized into three
twenty-one-plane squadrons: one fighter, one carrier attack, and one bombing.
The VS squadron on American carriers and the preponderance of scout
bombers in air groups attest to the significance the Americans placed on
1 2 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
IJN USN
Type* Mfg/Model Number % Mfg/Model Number %
VF Mitsubishi A6M 21 33 Grumman F4F 18 25
VB Aichi D3A 21 33 Douglas SBD 18 25
VS — — Douglas SBD 18 25
VT Nakajima B2N 21 33 Douglas TBD 18 25
Total Aircraft 63 72
* VF = fighter, VB = dive-bomber, VS = scouting, VT = torpedo bomber
TABLE 2
STANDARD CARRIER AIR GROUP COMPLEMENTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
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scouting. The exercises of the early 1930s had pointed to the need for a fast, well
armed scout plane that could not only find the enemy carrier but attack its flight
deck. Heeding the advice of the aviators, the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics
began to develop a series of scout bombers that evolved into the SBD, a plane
that proved to be a superb dive-bomber as well as an effective scout.
The contrasting lack of reconnaissance planes and the preponderance of tor-
pedo and dive-bombing aircraft on board Japanese carriers were in keeping with
the IJN’s emphasis on attack. The IJN’s preference for the torpedo plane (the
“carrier attack plane,” in Japanese naval parlance) was in keeping with the IJN’s
faith in the torpedo as a weapon that could inflict severe underwater damage on
almost any warship. This was contrary to the view of U.S. naval aviators, who be-
lieved that the torpedo was an inefficient weapon of aerial warfare, based on the
small size of its warhead in relation to the total weight. To the Americans, hitting
under the waterline did not appear to be a unique advantage; tests conducted in
1924 on the incomplete battleship Washington had shown that a heavy bomb
falling close alongside would produce the same damage.27 American pilots were
also skeptical of the torpedo plane’s ability to survive at the slow speeds and low
altitudes required for a successful attack. It was only because the torpedo (in the
absence of an effective armor-piercing bomb capable of penetrating four inches
of hardened steel) was the only aerial weapon that could significantly damage a
heavily armored battleship that a VT squadron was retained in limited numbers
on American carriers.28
While the airmen on both sides were perfecting the tactical procedures and
aircraft that would ultimately define their respective air groups, their flag offi-
cers were wrestling with the force-structure and doctrinal issues (the last stage in
Hundley’s model) raised by the increasing combat effectiveness of air warfare
and the growing number of carriers within their fleets. The conundrum facing
all these leaders was how to protect the inherently vulnerable carrier and yet
maximize its tactical effectiveness.
In the U.S. Navy, the main question was the positioning of carriers with re-
spect to the main body of the fleet. Although the carrier task force had become a
regular feature of exercises, the Navy’s battleship admirals continued to insist
that carriers remain with the battleships for mutual support.29 At issue was the
survival of the carriers, which were now considered essential for fleet air defense.
Tying the carriers to the slow battleships was the kiss of death, according to the
Navy’s airmen, who argued “that evasive movements at high speed were a car-
rier’s best protection against attack.”30 The Americans continued to experiment
until the fleet moved to Hawaii in 1940; by then, carriers had become the center
of the cruising formation when operating with the fleet. The question of the car-
riers’ position within the fleet’s force structure—both its physical location and
W I L D E N B E R G 1 2 7
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tactical function—was not fully resolved in the U.S. Navy until after the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, when carriers became its preeminent striking force by
default. When hostilities commenced, however, all the pieces were in place for
the deployment of a number of carrier task forces, complete with heavy escorts
of cruisers and destroyers, and accompanied in every instance by an oiler for lo-
gistic support.31
In the meantime, the Japanese navy had embarked on a much different path.
As Mark Peattie and the late Dave Evans explain in their groundbreaking history,
the lessons learned during warfare with China inevitably led Japan’s naval lead-
ers to conclude that carriers had to be concentrated to provide the large num-
bers of aircraft that seemed needed to achieve air superiority.32 However, like
their American counterparts, they understood the vulnerability of aircraft
carriers and that grouping
them together would be
extremely dangerous, not
only tactically but opera-
tionally—all the force’s
carriers would be exposed
to attack if any one of them
was detected. A solution to this dilemma, one that Peattie and Evans describe as
one of “tactical effectiveness versus strategic risk,” emerged at the end of 1940,
when the “box” carrier formation was first introduced in the IJN.33 The arrange-
ment enabled the rapid massing of air groups for offensive operations but also
an augmented protective combat air patrol.
Operational experiments with this new formation were conducted in early
1941. By then Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Com-
bined Fleet, had submitted a paper to the navy minister, Koshiro Oikawa, insist-
ing that the IJN “deliver a fierce attack on the American fleet at the outset of
hostilities to demoralize the U.S. Navy.”34 The instrument that would be chosen
for Yamamoto’s surprise attack was the First Air Fleet, a unit of the Japanese
navy that came into being in April 1941, when all three carrier divisions were
combined with two seaplane divisions and ten destroyers into what was then
“the most powerful agglomeration of naval air power in the world.”35 Although
the First Air Fleet represented a radical innovation in terms of naval organiza-
tion, it was not a tactical formation that could undertake a naval operation on its
own, for it would need escorts and logistical support.
Though the multicarrier attack was a brilliant tactical innovation, it did not
challenge the concepts underlying the IJN’s overall strategy of overpowering the
U.S. Navy by destroying its battle line at sea.36 When the Combined Fleet sailed
for Midway at the end of May 1942, the battleship remained the centerpiece of
1 2 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Yamamoto’s strategy for dominating the Pacific. “For all his lip service to the
principle of the offensive and to naval air power,” he “still . . . visualized the
battleship as the queen of the fleet.”37 As part of the operation, Yamamoto
hoped to draw out remnants of the U.S. Pacific Fleet so that it could be engaged
in the “decisive battle” that still remained the focus of Japanese naval strategy.38
Instead of using his battleships in direct support of his carriers (as suggested by
Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi), Yamamoto stationed the three powerful
dreadnoughts of the Combined Fleet far to the rear, to surprise and destroy any
American surface force bold enough to attempt to interfere with the invasion of
Midway.39
While the First Air Fleet (designated the “Mobile Force” in this operation)
was steaming in what would prove to be its highly vulnerable box formation to-
ward Midway, the three carriers (Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet) available to
the commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area at the end of May 1942, Admi-
ral Chester W. Nimitz, sortied from Pearl Harbor. They steamed in two task
forces, the tactical units that had come to dominate U.S. naval operations since 7
December 1941. Unlike its adversary across the Pacific, the U.S. Navy’s love affair
with the battleship now rested in the mud of Pearl Harbor, where a number of its
cherished “battlewagons” were being laboriously salvaged. Though Nimitz still
had a strong force of battleships (Task Force 1 comprised Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Colorado, Idaho, Tennessee, New Mexico, and Mississippi), he chose not to deploy
them; they would only slow the carriers down and would require screening ships
that were needed more elsewhere.40 Nimitz also deployed a number of submarines
for the defense of Midway; however, they too would not be a factor in the battle,
the outcome of which would be determined by airpower alone.
The outcome of the battle of Midway was decided, and the fate of the IJN was
sealed, at precisely 10:22 AM on 4 June 1942, when the first of three squadrons of
American dive-bombers from Yorktown and Enterprise attacked the First Air
Fleet as it was preparing to launch its own planes against the U.S. carriers.41 The
American planes struck the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu in quick succession, setting
all three ablaze within three minutes. The surviving Japanese carrier, Hiryu,
quickly retaliated. After an exchange of air strikes that afternoon, Hiryu was
burning from stem to stern, while its opponent, Yorktown, was dead in the water,
without power. Hiryu sank the next day. Yorktown survived long enough to be
taken under tow but then was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine.
The different paths of carrier development taken by the Japanese and American
navies led to differences in carrier doctrine—differences that had a tremendous
impact once the two forces were engaged. First and foremost of these was the
American airmen’s obsession with locating the enemy’s carriers first so they
W I L D E N B E R G 1 2 9
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could be struck first. This principle became sacrosanct in U.S. carrier doctrine as
soon as commanders realized that the best way to achieve air supremacy was to
attack the opposing carrier before it had a chance to get its own planes in the air.
Once launched, such a strike would be almost impossible to fend off, since (prior
to the introduction of radar) there was virtually no way to detect approaching
enemy planes or direct fighters to intercept them.42 Although the Japanese un-
derstood this principle, they made no attempt to find an adequate means of lo-
cating the enemy’s carriers.43 As Mark Peattie aptly points out, success
“depended not only upon the time required for carriers to launch their attack
squadrons but, even before that, upon finding the enemy first.”44
That the lack of a carrier-borne capability for scouting (reconnaissance, in
Japanese naval parlance) contributed greatly to the demise of the Japanese carri-
ers was affirmed by Akagi’s former air officer, Mitsuo Fuchida. As Fuchida ex-
plained, writing in 1955, Japanese carrier forces were devoted entirely to the
attack mission.45 There were no organic scouting units of any appreciable size in
the Japanese navy, and very little emphasis was placed on this important aspect
of carrier warfare: “In both training and organization our naval aviators [de-
voted] too much importance and effort . . . to attack.”46 Reluctance to weaken the
carriers’ striking power led to a single-phase search plan that was insufficient—
in Fuchida’s opinion—to ensure the carriers’ security. “Had Admiral [Chuichi]
Nagumo [the commander of the Mobile Force] carried out an earlier and more
carefully planned two-phase search . . . the disaster that followed might have
been avoided.”47
The second doctrine-based difference was the predominance of the scout/
dive-bomber on the American side. This type was unique to the U.S. Navy and
could both locate and attack an enemy carrier. The effectiveness of the scout/dive-
bomber (particularly the superb SBD, which outflew, outdove, and outbombed
the Japanese Val) was proved beyond the shadow of a doubt at Midway.48
Last, but certainly not least, was the adoption of the deck park and the associ-
ated handling procedures devised by American airmen to maximize the number
of aircraft that could be operated at one time from an aircraft carrier. This sys-
tem enabled the U.S. Navy to operate more aircraft per carrier than its Japanese
counterparts and thus to fly almost as many aircraft as the Japanese at Midway,
with one less carrier. The deck park allowed a second dive-bombing squadron
(though bearing the VS designation) to be added to each carrier’s air group. It
was one of these squadrons, VS-6 from the Enterprise, that made up for the lost
planes from the Hornet, which failed to locate the enemy carriers. The extra
squadron allowed the United States to strike three carriers at once, leaving just
one. The outcome at Midway would have been very different had VS-6 not been
present.
1 3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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On the downside, the U.S. Navy’s reliance on the deck park meant that the en-
tire air strike group had to be launched at one time. This worked well during the
short-range simulated engagements conducted during the thirties, when the
various squadron types could circle the carrier while the air group formed up. At
Midway differences in aircraft range, cruising speed, and the takeoff run for each
type (VF, VB, VTB),
combined with the ex-
treme range to target,
played havoc with the
air group’s ability to
conduct any kind of a
coordinated attack.
The piecemeal commitment of forces that resulted from this approach and the
lack of satisfactory air cover had disastrous consequences for the torpedo squad-
rons, which were all but annihilated.
In terms of launching aircraft, the Japanese had devised a workable doctrine
that was in some ways superior to the U.S. technique. By contrast they developed
the concept of the “deckload spot,” wherein each carrier contributed one of its
attack units (VB or VTB) and then some number of escort fighters.49 Not only
was this technique better suited to the smaller flight decks of the Hiryu and the
Soryu, but it was highly advantageous when it came to coordinating air strikes
from multiple carriers. The latter enabled the Japanese to conduct the massive
air strikes that were the hallmark of the First Air Fleet.
The lack of coordination among the American carriers was a major defi-
ciency that could have cost them the battle. Instead of assembling for a coordi-
nated strike, individual flights from different carriers—both torpedo and
dive-bombing—arrived over the target independently of each other and at-
tacked separately. This resulted in the ineffective torpedo plane attacks that pre-
ceded the arrival of the two flights of dive-bombers, whose simultaneous
appearance at this critical juncture of the battle was extremely fortuitous (many
would say “sheer luck”). A third flight of dive-bombers from the Hornet never
found the Japanese carriers.
The American victory at the battle of Midway was abetted by major weak-
nesses in Japanese carrier doctrine. The most significant of these was the IJN’s
inability to ensure (its leadership having previously failed to allocate sufficient
assets for searching) that no enemy carriers were in striking range of its own.
This fatal flaw in doctrine caused the Japanese to be caught while their hangar
decks were packed with aircraft being fueled and armed. The outcome of an at-
tack in such circumstances had been first predicted in 1933 by Commander
Hugh Douglas, U.S. Navy, before an audience at the Naval War College: “In case an
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enemy carrier is encountered with planes on deck, a successful dive bombing attack
by even a small number of planes may greatly influence future operations.”50 The
deadliness of such a contingency was well understood by American carrier avia-
tors, who continually worried about being caught in that perilous situation.51
The Japanese determination to deliver a massed air attack on Midway meant
that all four Japanese carriers were committed to preparations for a follow-up
strike just as the U.S. carriers were discovered. This deprived the Mobile Force of
the flexibility it needed to preempt the threat. Further, the box formation, which
was established to facilitate the massive aerial attacks invented by the IJN, also
contributed to the demise of the First Air Fleet. It would have been much more
difficult to locate and hit three Japanese carriers at once had the elements of the
Mobile Force been separated. Various arguments have been put forward in de-
fense of the box formation—indeed, the four-carrier task force was adopted by
the U.S. Navy later in the war; nevertheless, the fact remains that all three carri-
ers were caught together.
The doctrinal differences concerning the deployment of the naval forces avail-
able to each side indicate just how far each navy had come in adjusting to the
concepts later embodied in the Carrier Warfare Model of seapower. The dispar-
ity has important ramifications for the theory of revolutions in military affairs,
for it supports Hundley’s contention that it is not enough to be aware of an
emerging RMA. To avert the kind of disaster visited upon the Japanese at Mid-
way, a military must also be responsive to the implications of that RMA.52 The
Imperial Japanese Navy failed at Midway to take account of the consequences of
the fundamental changes in naval warfare that they themselves had helped to
initiate at Pearl Harbor.53
Several conclusions can be drawn. First, force structure and doctrine play
critical roles; both are crucial to successful transformation in an armed service’s
ability to wage war. Second—and this, to some bureaucrats at least, is a painful
revelation—technological prowess alone is insufficient to achieve a revolution
in military affairs. Lastly, but most unsettling to military leaders, different paths
lead to different technical solutions. The examples analyzed here show that
chance and circumstances often play major roles in the evolutionary path taken
by a military establishment as it attempts to adapt to new technologies and the
changes they bring to the character of warfare.
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